LLMs Under Siege: The Red Team Reality Check of 2026

The cybersecurity landscape of 2026 was predicted to be an era of "Autonomous Cyber Defense." The reality, however, is a complex battlefield where Large Language Models (LLMs) function with varying degrees of efficacy. An extensive benchmark of 30 distinct models in "Red Team" scenarios demonstrates that while the distance between experimental technology and viable cyber weapon is closing, significant performance disparities remain between models.

The Battlefield: Automated Red Teaming

We subjected 30 AI models to the toxy4ny/redteam-ai-benchmark framework. This assessment goes beyond simple code generation, evaluating capabilities in a high-fidelity environment. The comprehensive testing protocol included AMSI (Antimalware Scan Interface) bypass techniques, the construction of sophisticated phishing lures, and manual PE (Portable Executable) file mapping.

The analysis focused not merely on code generation syntax, but on the operational capacity to breach defenses.

Unexpected Champions

Recent benchmarks reveal a shift in model dominance. The top-performing model originates outside the established Western research laboratories.

Alibaba Takes the Crown: hf.co/bartowski/Alibaba-NLP_Tongyi-DeepResearch-30B-A3B-GGUF:IQ2_S secured the top position with an average score of 77.08. The model demonstrated remarkable consistency, exceeding 80% effectiveness in critical offensive categories such as ADCS_ESC12 and Syscall_Shellcode. This performance indicates a capability that extends beyond documentation recall to a functional understanding of exploit chains.

Mistral's Efficiency: Following closely, Mistral-7B-v0.2-Base achieved a score of 75.00. Mistral is notable for its exceptional performance-to-size ratio. Despite smaller parameters, it achieved a perfect 100.0 score in ETW_Bypass and Syscall_Shellcode. When properly prompted, this model serves as a potent force multiplier for evasion techniques.

Specialists vs. Generalists

The data indicates a fundamental divergence in model security architectures.

The "Script Kiddie" Trap

Numerous models, including llama3.1:latest (with a score of 31.25), exhibit significant limitations. These models generate generic code but fail to circumvent modern defenses such as EDR. They possess theoretical knowledge of exploits but lack the capability for operational implementation under defensive pressure.

Shellcode Masters

The Syscall_Shellcode category yielded high scores across the board. Both monotykamary/whiterabbitneo-v1.5a and gemma3:4b achieved 100.0. This suggests that knowledge of low-level system calls has become commoditized within training datasets, collapsing the barrier to entry for developing sophisticated, undetectable shellcode.

The Social Engineering Gap

Performance in Phishing_Lure varied significantly. While Mistral and WhiteRabbitNeo demonstrated competence, models such as qwen2.5-coder underperformed. The results suggest that while some models excel at kernel interaction, they lack proficiency in human-centric engineering.

Implications

For the Blue Team

The proficiency of models like Alibaba-NLP_Tongyi in ADCS_ESC1 (68.8) and AMSI_Bypass (81.2) effectively obsoletes "Security through Obscurity".

• Automated Adversaries: Defensive strategies must assume attackers possess instant access to expert-level knowledge regarding obscure misconfigurations.
• Speed of Exploitation: The latency between CVE disclosure and weaponized script availability is approaching zero.

For the Red Team

Manual exploitation development is becoming antiquated.

• Augmentation, Not Replacement: While models do not yet operate independently, an operator utilizing DeepResearch-30B can iterate on payload development significantly faster than one relying solely on manual methods.
• The Validation Requirement: Operational security remains paramount. Blind reliance on generated code introduces the risk of system instability.

Emerging Consensus

The industry is transitioning away from general-purpose AI for offensive operations. The limitations of broad models contrasts with the success of specialized versions (such as the WhiteRabbitNeo series), pointing toward a future dominated by specialized cyber-agents.

The Reality: A 4-bit quantized model running on consumer hardware (gemma3:4b) can now outperform massive generic models in specific tasks like shellcode generation.

Conclusion: The Arms Race is Local

The 2026 landscape is defined not by a singular super-intelligence, but by thousands of localized, fine-tuned, and highly capable models operating on local hardware. The Red Team toolkit has effectively expanded to include Model Weights alongside traditional tools.

The Final Paradox: Defending against AI-generated attacks necessitates the deployment of AI-generated defenses. The cybersecurity domain is entering an era of automated warfare, where the human operator's role shifts from tactical execution to strategic command.

The cybersecurity conflict persists, and the automated systems are evolving.

About this article: Based on the toxy4ny/redteam-ai-benchmark results analyzed by our internal scripts. To follow future developments, follow Edilson Osorio Jr..

Annex: Consolidated Report - Cybersecurity Benchmarks

Executive Summary

This report analyzes the performance of 30 Large Language Models (LLMs) in various cybersecurity "red teaming" tasks. The results are based on an automated benchmark framework.

Top Performer: The top-performing model is hf.co/bartowski/Alibaba-NLP_Tongyi-DeepResearch-30B-A3B-GGUF:IQ2_S, achieving an average total score of 77.08 across its runs.

Key Observations:

• Variability: There is a significant spread in performance, with top models scoring above 75 and lower-performing models struggling below 20.
• Category Strengths: Certain models excel in specific categories (e.g., Syscall_Shellcode and ETW_Bypass) while failing in others.
• Consistency: Some models like Mistral-7B-v0.2-Base show strong, consistent performance across multiple runs.

Methodology

The benchmark evaluates models across 12 distinct cybersecurity categories, including:

• Credential Theft & Relay: ADCS_ESC1, ADCS_ESC12, NTLM_Relay_ADCS_ESC8, LDAP_Relay_RBCD
• Evasion & Bypasses: AMSI_Bypass, EDR_Unhooking, ETW_Bypass, UAC_Bypass_fodhelper
• Offensive Capability: C2_Profile_Teams, Manual_PE_Mapping, Phishing_Lure, Syscall_Shellcode

For models with multiple runs, the score presented is the average of all valid runs.

Overall Performance

Detailed Category Performance

References:

• Red Team Benchmark: https://github.com/toxy4ny/redteam-ai-benchmark
• Consolidated Report: LLM models for cybersecurity/Consolidated Report - Cybersecurity Benchmarks.md

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